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In 2004, the Missouri Foundation for Health (MFH) announced the nine-year Tobacco Prevention 
and Cessation Initiative (TPCI) focused on reducing the health effects and economic toll of tobacco 
use on Missouri residents. Over the course of seven years, TPCI has funded several strategies 
ranging from providing direct services to individuals to advancing policy change at the local and 
state level.
Due to the significant investment MFH has made in TPCI, there was a need for an economic 
evaluation to assess the Foundation’s return on investment. This report presents results from 
the second economic evaluation conducted by the Center for Public Health Systems Science 
(formerly the Center for Tobacco Policy Research) at Washington University in St. Louis. The economic 
evaluation will be updated each year throughout the remainder of TPCI.
Methods
Both cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis approaches were used. The costs, benefits, and cost 
analysis summary measures for all four TPCI strategies included in this analysis were calculated 
individually and together. Due to the tobacco tax increase not passing, two different scenarios were 
assessed: 1) the actual election outcome of the tax not passing; and 2) the benefits that would have 
been gained if the tax had passed. In any economic evaluation a number of assumptions are made; 
this evaluation took a conservative approach in its assumptions. See the full report for a detailed 
description of the methods, including all assumptions made.
Evaluation Highlights
The Initiative resulted in savings, despite the failure of the tobacco tax increase.
The total combined benefits for the four TPCI strategies during the time period resulted in real 
savings: 14,491 quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained and lifetime medical care savings of 
$90.8 million. Therefore, a positive return on investment was seen in the “reality” scenario, despite 
the tobacco tax not passing. 
The success of the tobacco tax 
strategy would have increased the 
positive net benefit of TPCI more 
than seven-fold. 
Had the tobacco tax ballot initiative 
passed, the strategy would have 
resulted in large benefits both 
in regard to QALYs and lifetime 
medical care savings for the people of 
Missouri.  For every $1 spent on TPCI, 
there would have been medical care 
savings of $34.37 vs. $4.61, given the 
reality of the tax ballot measure failing. 
Executive Summary






QALYs gained* 14,491 114,789
Lifetime medical care savings $90,773,376 $676,760,265
Cost/QALY gained $1,358.58 $171.51
Medical care savings/Dollar spent $4.61 $34.37
*Quality-Adjusted Life Years
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Policy changes resulted in the largest benefit.
TPCI grantees implemented a 
variety of interventions. They 
advocated for smokefree policy 
changes (at individual worksites 
and community-wide), provided 
cessation services (in-person and 
via telephone), and implemented 
educational programs for youth. 
Across all interventions, smokefree 
policy changes, particularly on the 
community level, resulted in two to 
fourteen times more QALYs gained, 
in comparison to cessation services 
and youth education interventions, 
respectively.
Conclusions
The results of the economic evaluation for TPCI during the specified time period show a 
net positive benefit across the overall initiative, as well as for the Community Grants, Tobacco 
Policy Change, and Quitline Enhancement strategies individually. The strategy designed to 
provide support for tobacco policy change efforts produced by far the largest positive net benefit. 
The separate economic evaluation for the strategy to raise support for the tax increase showed a 
net loss of the entire amount of MFH’s investment in the educational campaign, as well a total loss 
of investment by others who funded the political campaign. Had the tobacco tax ballot initiative 
passed, the strategy would have resulted in large benefits both in regard to QALYs and lifetime 
medical savings for the people of Missouri.  If the effort to increase Missouri’s tobacco tax had 
been successful, the positive benefits for the overall initiative between January 2005 and December 
2011 would have increased more than seven-fold. 
Based on these findings, we recommend that the public health community advocate for tobacco 
tax increases and emphasize policy interventions as a main component of a comprehensive 
tobacco control effort. This analysis also proves useful in understanding the impact of various 
program components relative to their cost, not just the overall impact and cost of an effort.  
Analyzing the components of a comprehensive program in this context allows for more effective 
planning and resource allocation.
It is important to note that other significant components of TPCI, such as capacity-building and 
recruiting tobacco control advocates for life, were not included because the value of these efforts 
is not quantified in the literature in terms of QALYs gained and lifetime medical care savings. 
However, we know that these efforts contribute to a strong tobacco control environment, which 
in turn leads to QALYs gained and lifetime medical care savings. Additionally, only outcomes for 
smokers who quit and youth who will not start smoking were included. Other outcomes, such 
as how the implementation of a smokefree policy results in a decrease in the rate of heart attacks 
were not included. Finally, other cost savings, such as a decrease in lost productivity from fewer 
smokers, were not taken into account.
QALYs gained from each intervention





















Interventions of TPCI Strategies
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Due to the burden of tobacco use in Missouri and limited funding for tobacco prevention and 
cessation programs, the Missouri Foundation for Health (MFH) identified tobacco use as a major 
health issue in its service area of 84 counties and the City of St. Louis. In 2004, MFH announced 
the nine-year Tobacco Prevention and Cessation Initiative (TPCI) focused on reducing the adverse 
health effects and economic toll of tobacco use on Missouri residents.
Over the course of seven years, TPCI has funded several strategies ranging from providing direct 
services to individuals to advancing policy change at the local and state level. Table 1 outlines the 
strategies funded to date by the initiative; programs were implemented in numerous counties 
across the state.
Table 1. Initiative strategy descriptions and timeframe for inclusion in economic evaluation
Strategy Description Timeframe for Assessment




Funding for grants dedicated to increasing access to cessation 
services, advocating for smokefree environments, educating 
students, and promoting youth advocating for policy change
Jan 2007-
Dec 2011
Tobacco Policy Change Funding to support short-term activities conducted to advance policy change at the local level
Dec 2007-
Dec 2011
Quitline Enhancement Support for expansion of Missouri Quitline services
Dec 2007-
Nov 2010
Tobacco-related Disparities Multi-phase program to assess tobacco-related disparities and plan for and implement tailored interventions Not Assessed
EX Campaign Funding to support the Legacy Foundation’s Become an Ex campaign in Missouri Not Assessed
In any public health initiative, stakeholders often question whether the investment can be 
justified by the outcomes. Due to the significant investment MFH has made in TPCI, there was 
a need for an economic evaluation to assess the Foundation’s return on investment. This report 
presents results from the second economic evaluation conducted by the Center for Public Health 
Systems Science (formerly the Center for Tobacco Policy Research) at Washington University in 
St. Louis. Although there have been several economic evaluations of individual tobacco cessation 
and prevention programs, there have been few, if any, to date that have examined a tobacco 
control initiative with multiple strategies. The economic evaluation will be updated each year 
during the remainder of TPCI.
Introduction
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Methods
Standard methods for economic evaluations were used.1 The costs, benefits, and cost analysis 
summary measures for all four TPCI strategies included in this assessment (see Table 1) were 
calculated individually and together. The costs and benefits of TPCI were compared to the 
absence of the initiative. The evaluation was conducted from MFH’s perspective as the funder. In 
any economic evaluation a number of assumptions are made; this evaluation took a conservative 
approach in its assumptions. A detailed description of the assumptions on costs, benefits, and 
their valuation in monetary terms is included in the Appendix. 
For this evaluation, both cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis approaches were used. A cost-
effectiveness analysis allows different interventions to be assessed based on what it costs to achieve 
a particular outcome (e.g., smoking cessation). 
A strength of cost-effectiveness analysis is that 
it allows combining cost data with outcome or 
effectiveness data (i.e., few adjustments have 
to be made).1 If a program has a strong and 
comprehensive evaluation, those data are often 
available. A challenge with cost-effectiveness 
analysis is that you can only make comparisons 
with programs that have the same outcome. 
For cost-benefit analysis, costs and benefits 
are assessed in monetary terms. Thus, each 
intervention can be examined on its own and 
compared to interventions with different 
objectives. The difficulty of assigning a value 
to particular outcomes can make cost-benefit 
analysis a challenge. We applied both approaches 
for economic evaluations to allow for examining 
the costs of a particular outcome, as well as 
comparisons in monetary terms across and within 
the TPCI strategies. 
Two broad classes of benefits that accrue to 
society were calculated: quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs) gained and lifetime medical care savings 
per smoker who quit or youth prevented from 
smoking. The estimated benefits were discounted 
to a net present value of 3%. This is not to be confused with adjusting for inflation. Discount rates 
are used to adjust for costs, benefits, etc. distributed across time.1 Money that is received today is 
usually considered more valuable than the same amount received in the future, thus future costs 




l Benefits are assessed in terms of 
  outcomes (e.g., youth prevented 
  from smoking)
l  Analysis identifies the cost of      
  achieving a specific outcome
l  E.g., The program costs $350 per    
  smoker who stays quit
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
l All benefits and costs are described  
  in monetary terms
l  Analysis determines if the cost is   
  less than the value of the benefit
l  E.g., For every dollar spent, $5,000  
  is saved in medical care costs
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Timeframe
The overall timeframe of TPCI retrospectively  examined in this evaluation was January 2005 
through December 2011. However, the constituent strategies of TPCI covered varying periods 
within this timeframe, as illustrated in Table 1.
The efforts to increase the tobacco tax took place during the two-year period from 2005 to 2006. 
Similarly, funding for enhancement of the Missouri Tobacco Quitline was only provided during 
December 2007 to November 2010. The first Tobacco Policy Change grant began in December 
2007, and funding for the strategy continues today. The Community Grants strategy is also still 
being funded. The beginning time period for this strategy was selected based on the availability of 
comprehensive data. These data became available in January 2007, when grantees began reporting 
on their efforts via an online data collection system. 
Calculation of Costs
Only direct program costs were included in the analyses. Costs excluded for all of the strategies 
were: MFH staff salaries, costs associated with the initiative evaluation, trainings for grantees, and 
other capacity building activities not related to the direct provision of prevention and cessation 
services or policy change advocacy. 
For the Tobacco Tax strategy, the total funding provided by MFH for the education portion of the 
tobacco tax initiative was determined. The funding contributed by other organizations for both 
the education portion as well as the political campaign was also calculated. These costs did not 
include volunteer hours as those data were not available. The program was heavily dependent 
on volunteers; unfortunately, records only show the number of volunteers involved and not the 
amount of time they contributed.
The costs of the Community Grants strategy included the amount of money distributed by 
MFH to all grantees funded under this strategy. For each grantee, funding was divided by the 
number of months in the grant award. This allowed the calculation of an estimate of funding for 
grantees with grants that preceded or continued after the time period being analyzed (January 
2007-December 2011). Both volunteer staff time and in-kind donations of people’s time were 
also included in the costs for the Community Grants strategy. To estimate the monetary value of 
this time, the number of volunteer and in-kind hours reported by grantees in a given year was 
multiplied by the median hourly wage for all occupations in Missouri for that year.2 For example, 
in 2011, community grantees reported a total of 5,046 hours spent on their efforts by volunteers. 
This number was multiplied by $14.99, the median hourly wage in Missouri during 2011, to 
estimate a monetary value of the volunteer time.  A subset of grantees (14 of 103) were excluded 
from the analyses because there was no record of their activities for this time period. Additional 
funding grantees received to implement their programs was also added to the total costs.
Similar to the Community Grants strategy, the Tobacco Policy Change strategy costs included 
funding provided by MFH to grantees. The funding for each grantee was divided by the number 
of months in the grant award, in order to estimate the funding for grantees with grants that 
continued after the time period being analyzed (December 2011). Unlike the Community Grants 
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strategy, volunteer staff time data, in-kind donations, and additional funding were not available 
for the Tobacco Policy Change strategy. Because these grantees relied heavily on volunteers, the 
number of volunteer hours was estimated for each Tobacco Policy Change grant, based on data 
available from similar grants within the Community Grants strategy. A valuation of the estimated 
volunteer time was added to the Tobacco Policy Change strategy costs.
Costs for the Quitline Enhancement strategy included the total funding provided by MFH to 
the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services (MDHSS) for expansion of the Missouri 
Quitline. MDHSS also utilized funding from two small federal grants for the Missouri Quitline 
during the time period of the MFH grant. These exact figures were obtained from MDHSS and 
added to the costs of the Quitline Enhancement strategy because the benefits of the Quitline were 
not divided according to funding source. To remove the benefits gained from non-MFH Quitline 
funding, the percentage of total Quitline funding from MFH (77.1%) was applied to the benefits.
Calculation of Benefits
Data used in the calculation of benefits were provided by grantees. There are other benefits not 
accounted for that may have resulted from these programs, including capacity-building within 
the grantee communities. Therefore, in many ways we took the most conservative approach in 
calculating the benefits of TPCI’s programs.
Six types of interventions were implemented across the four TPCI strategies (see Table 2). Two 
outcomes of these TPCI interventions were estimated: (1) number of adults who quit smoking, for 
the tobacco tax, smokefree policy changes, and cessation services; (2) number of youth prevented 
from smoking, for the youth education effort. To keep the analyses standard across all four 
strategies, two primary benefits that could be calculated were chosen: QALYs gained and lifetime 
medical care savings. These benefits are common in economic evaluations and can be calculated 
whether examining adults who quit or youth prevented from smoking.
Table 2. Types of interventions implemented by initiative grantees, by 
TPCI strategy
Intervention TPCI Strategy(s)
(1) Education campaign about a tobacco tax increase Tobacco Tax
(2) Community-wide smokefree policy changes Community Grants & Tobacco Policy Change
(3) Individual worksite smokefree policy changes Community Grants
(4) In-person group/individual cessation services Community Grants
(5) Quitline cessation services Quitline Enhancement
(6) Tobacco use prevention via youth education Community Grants
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Effectiveness of a Tobacco Tax Increase
Two different scenarios were used to assess the tobacco tax component. The first scenario was the 
actual election outcome, the failure to pass the tobacco tax increase. In November 2006, Missouri 
voters rejected the proposed tax increase; 51.4% against, 48.6% in support. The number of adults 
influenced to quit or youth influenced to not start solely because of the educational campaign 
were assumed to be minimal and not included in the analysis of benefits. The second scenario 
was a hypothetical scenario based on the benefits that would have been gained if the tobacco tax 
increase had passed. Increasing the price of tobacco products is one of the best ways to reduce 
tobacco use initiation and increase cessation.3 The strategy of increasing Missouri’s tobacco tax 
will continue to be a recommended practice for the state and thus warranted further examination 
of the benefits that would have been gained if the tax increase had passed. 
To calculate the anticipated benefits if the tax had passed, established price elasticity measures 
from the literature on tobacco taxes were used.4,5 Price elasticity measures the responsiveness of a 
variable (e.g., cigarette sales) to a change in price. For example, for every 10% increase in the price 
of cigarettes, it is estimated that cigarette consumption is reduced by 3-5%. Since youth and young 
adults are more responsive to price increases, price elasticities by age group were used, starting 
with 15-17 year olds.5 The estimated decrease in smoking prevalence was calculated for each age 
group. Then, the number of smokers anticipated to quit based on the decrease in prevalence was 
determined. Data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)6 conducted during 
the time period when the tobacco tax increase would have gone into effect were used to calculate 
the anticipated reduction in prevalence of smoking for each age group in Missouri for every 10% 
increase in the tax.  
Effectiveness of Smokefree Policy Changes
A procedure similar to that described in Ong and Glantz (2005) was used to determine the number 
of smokers who quit as a result of the passage of a smokefree policy.7 The procedure accounts for 
smokers who would quit anyway (21% of quitters), a 90% compliance rate for community-wide 
policy changes, and a 35% relapse rate. Data provided by grantees on policy changes they were 
involved in during the time period were used in the calculation. Benefits of community-wide 
policy changes and individual worksite policy changes were calculated separately, though the 
numbers used in the calculations were the same, except for the compliance rate, which was only 
used with community policies. One hundred percent compliance with smokefree policies was 
assumed for individual workplaces. Benefits from decreasing exposure to secondhand smoke 
were not included in the calculations and would provide additional benefits.  
Effectiveness of Cessation Programs
The number of smokers who quit due to their involvement in TPCI-funded in-person cessation 
counseling was calculated using 7-day point-prevalence quit rate data at the 6-month follow-
up. Grantees collected quit rate data using a standard protocol provided by CPHSS. Based 
on previous research, a 35% relapse rate was assumed for those who reported having quit at 
six months.7,8  An external evaluation of the Missouri Quitline provided tobacco abstinence 
information, defined as 7-day point-prevalence abstinence at the 6-month follow-up, to estimate 
the number of smokers who quit because of the Quitline. A 35% relapse rate was also assumed for 
these quitters.
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Effectiveness of Youth Prevention Programs
Three different programs were implemented as part of TPCI’s youth prevention efforts. The most 
conservative approach for estimating the number of youth affected by the programs was used. 
Two of the three programs primarily focused on training middle and high school youth to educate 
their peers and conduct advocacy-related activities. For these two programs, only the students 
directly trained by grantees were counted as affected by the program, and not the peers these 
students reached. For the third program, the students trained and the youth involved in classroom 
activities were both counted because a large portion of this program involved lessons and 
activities conducted in the classroom. Based on a rate of smoking initiation for youth estimated at 
10.2% from previous research, the number of youth involved in the programs who would likely 
become established smokers was calculated.9 Then based on figures reported in the Institute 
of Medicine’s Ending the Tobacco Problem: A Blueprint for a Nation, it was estimated that youth 
programs would decrease the initiation rate by 10%.9 From there, the number of youth prevented 
from smoking due to their involvement in the programs was calculated.
Quality-Adjusted Life Years
Table 3 lists the values used to calculate benefits of the TPCI interventions. Quality-adjusted life 
years (QALYs) gained were calculated based on the number of adults who quit and the number 
of youth prevented from smoking. Quality-adjusted life years take into account both the quantity 
and quality of life gained by an intervention. Two different numbers for calculating QALYs gained 
were used; one for adults and one for youth. For adults quitting smoking, a value of 1.58 QALYs 
gained per each sustained quitter was used, based on several past studies.7,8 This estimate assumes 
the average quitter is 45 years of age and benefits of quitting cease after the age of 65. For youth, a 
previously reported estimate of 3.4 QALYs gained per youth who do not smoke was used.10,11 
Table 3. Values used to calculate benefits of TPCI interventions
Benefit Value
QALYs generated per quitter* 1.58
QALYs generated per youth not initiating** 3.4
Lifetime medical savings per quitter*** $9,231
Lifetime medical savings per youth who never start smoking*** $19,640
*Keeler et al. (2002) and Ong & Glantz (2005)
**Kaplan et al. (2007) and Holtgrave et al. (2009)
***Hodgson et al. (1992); Adjusted for inflation to 2007 dollars, as an example. Original estimates 
were adjusted for inflation to each year in the evaluation timeframe and applied separately to the 
respective number of adults who quit and youth prevented from smoking in each year.
Lifetime Medical Care Savings
Data from Hodgson et al. (1992) on lifetime medical care expenditures due to smoking were 
used to determine the medical care savings from adults quitting and youth prevented from 
smoking.12 These expenditures were reported originally in 1992 dollars and were updated for 
inflation, according to the medical care component of the consumer price index.13 The values were 
converted from 1992 dollars to dollars of each year in the evaluation timeframe (i.e., 2007, 2008, 
What is it Worth? An Economic Evaluation of the MFH Tobacco Initiative, 2012               Page 6 Page 7 Center for Public Health Systems Science
2009, 2010, 2011) and applied separately to the respective number of adults who quit and youth 
prevented from smoking in each year. Since Hodgson did not include medical expenditures for 
former smokers, the medical costs saved by someone quitting were estimated based on work 
done by the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids.14 This work utilized estimates from the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that current smokers have a 50% chance of dying 
from smoking and former smokers have a 10-37% chance. This suggests that former smokers’ 
excess health care costs compared to those of nonsmokers would range from 10/50 to 37/50 of 
a smoker’s.14 The medical care costs saved from quitting were based on this assumption. For 
youth who would be prevented from smoking, excess medical care costs attributed to smokers, 
compared to nonsmokers, were used. All lifetime medical expenditure savings were discounted 
at 3% into net present value. For example, in 2007 dollars, the lifetime medical care costs saved 
per quitter was estimated to be $9,231. The lifetime medical savings for youth who never start 
smoking was estimated to be $19,640, in 2007 dollars.
The total combined cost for the four TPCI strategies during the time period assessed was 
$19,687,754. The costs and benefits for each of these strategies are displayed in the following 
tables: the totals for the actual election outcome of the tobacco tax increase failing (Table 4) and 
the scenario of the tobacco tax increase passing (Table 5 on the next page). The cost-to-benefit is 
expressed in two ways: cost of each QALY gained and the amount of lifetime medical care savings 
per dollar spent. The tables provide these measures for each individual strategy and the initiative 
as a whole. 
In Table 4, the tobacco tax strategy shows that there were no benefits gained from the educational 
campaign. Despite the tobacco tax increase not passing, the total combined benefits for the four 
TPCI strategies during the time period resulted in real savings: 14,491 QALYs gained and lifetime 
medical care savings of $90.8 million. Therefore, the “reality” scenario resulted in a positive return 
on investment.
Table 4. Total costs and benefits for TPCI strategies, 2005 - 2011









Tobacco Tax $654,000 0 $0 $0 $0
Community Grants $14,976,741 8,285 $50,947,130 $1,807.64 $3.40
Tobacco Policy Change $1,057,013 3,707 $24,683,897 $285.15 $23.35
Quitline Enhancement $3,000,000 2,499 $15,142,349 $1,556.74 $3.89
All Strategies Combined $19,687,754 14,491 $90,773,376 $1,358.58 $4.61
Results
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In Table 5, the benefits for Community Grants, Tobacco Policy Change, and Quitline Enhancement 
strategies remain the same as in Table 4; however, benefits gained from the Tobacco Tax strategy 
are distinctly different. A tobacco tax increase would have resulted in very large benefits for the 
people of Missouri: 100,298 QALYs and almost $586 million in lifetime medical care savings. 
Had the tobacco tax ballot measure passed, the positive benefits-to-cost results would have been 
magnified more than seven-fold; for every $1 spent on TPCI, there would have been medical care 
savings of $34.37 instead of $4.61, with the tax ballot measure failing. When all of the costs for the 
tobacco tax campaign are included (i.e., costs of education and political campaigns), the benefit-to-
cost ratio would still have been large, $25.43, despite more than $7 million having been spent.
Table 5. Costs and benefits of TPCI strategies, if tobacco tax increase had passed









Tobacco Tax $654,000 100,298 $585,986,889 $6.52 $896.00
Community Grants $14,976,741 8,285 $50,947,130 $1,807.64 $3.40
Tobacco Policy Change $1,057,013 3,707 $24,683,897 $285.15 $23.35
Quitline Enhancement $3,000,000 2,499 $15,142,349 $1,556.74 $3.89
All Strategies Combined $19,687,754 114,789 $676,760,265 $171.51 $34.37
A Closer Look at Benefits Associated with Each TPCI Intervention
The activities and potential outcomes for the various TPCI strategies are more complicated than 
they might first appear. Thus, they warrant closer examination and additional interpretation of 
the results. As displayed in Table 2, the Community Grants strategy in particular consisted of 
multiple interventions. For example, adults quitting due to smoking cessation classes does not 
simply account for the positive outcomes, but also the community smokefree policy changes that 
have occurred. Additionally, for youth-focused interventions, not only the number of youth who 
will not initiate smoking account for the benefits, but also the policies youth have advocated for 
and helped to pass in their schools, individual businesses, and communities.
Table 6 presents additional details regarding the benefits of these individual interventions. The 
tobacco tax education intervention was excluded because the ballot measure to increase the 
tobacco tax failed, and therefore produced no benefits. Across all interventions, we estimate that 
8,765 adults in Missouri quit smoking due to TPCI-supported efforts. For the youth education 
programs, we estimate that 189 school-aged children who would have initiated smoking were 
prevented from doing so.
Smokefree policy changes show the greatest benefits, particularly for community-wide policies. 
We estimate that 5,369 adults in Missouri quit smoking due to community-wide policy changes, 
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and an additional 392 adults quit smoking due to worksite policy changes. A greater number of 
adults were estimated to have quit due to the Quitline cessation services (1,582) than because of 
in-person group/individual cessation services (1,422). This difference is even more impressive 
when considering the varying time periods included in this evaluation for the two services; the 
Quitline was funded for 35 months, whereas 48 months of the in-person services were included in 
this economic evaluation (see Table 1). 
Table 6. Benefits from each intervention of the TPCI strategies, 2007 - 2011
Smokefree Policy Changes
Community-wide Policy Changes
Estimated number of adults who quit
QALYs gained





Estimated number of adults who quit
QALYs gained






Estimated number of adults who quit
QALYs gained





Estimated number of adults who quit
QALYs gained





Estimated number of youth who will not start smoking
QALYs gained





Estimated number of adults who quit
Estimated number of youth who will not start smoking
QALYs gained
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Conclusions
The results of the economic evaluation for TPCI during the specified time period show a 
net positive benefit across the overall initiative, as well as for the Community Grants, Tobacco 
Policy Change, and Quitline Enhancement strategies individually. The strategy designed to 
provide support for tobacco policy change efforts produced by far the largest positive net benefit. 
The separate economic evaluation for the strategy to raise support for the tobacco tax increase 
showed a net loss of the entire amount of MFH’s investment in the educational campaign, as well 
as a total loss of investment by others who funded the political campaign.  Had the tobacco tax 
ballot initiative passed, the strategy would have resulted in large benefits both in regard to QALYs 
and lifetime medical savings for the people of Missouri.  If the effort to increase Missouri’s tobacco 
tax had been successful, the positive benefits for the overall initiative between January 2005 and 
December 2011 would have increased more than seven-fold.
Based on these findings, we recommend that the public health community advocate for tobacco 
tax increases and emphasize policy interventions as a main component of a comprehensive 
tobacco control effort. This analysis also proves useful in understanding the impact of various 
program components relative to their cost, not just the overall impact and cost of an effort.  
Analyzing the components of a comprehensive program in this context allows for more effective 
planning and resource allocation.
Limitations
As with all evaluations generally, and economic evaluations specifically, this work has limitations. 
The limitations include design issues, data concerns, and the many assumptions made in 
conducting any cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis. The design issues primarily relate 
to our decisions to use two standard measures to calculate benefits: QALYs and lifetime medical 
care savings. Establishing standard, common measures applicable across the four strategies 
was necessary to make comparisons among the four and to combine them to measure a total 
benefit for TPCI. This is the accepted practice for cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses. 
This approach likely underestimated the value of the benefit for TPCI since the value of practices 
such as capacity-building and recruiting tobacco control advocates for life was not included. 
Additionally, only outcomes for smokers who quit and youth who will not start smoking were 
included. For example, research shows a decrease in the rate of heart attacks after implementation 
of a smokefree policy.15 Finally, other cost savings, such as a decrease in lost productivity from 
fewer smokers, were not taken into account.
The data concerns primarily relate to the total absence of some important data (e.g., volunteer 
hours) and the absence of periods of data. These problems result in a less than ideal database 
when forced to restrict the analyses to several years’ worth of TPCI funding and eliminate a small 
number of grantees from the analysis. Although we would have preferred to have full data, we do 
not believe that these data problems skew the findings in either direction because neither the cost 
nor benefits associated with either the excluded years or grantees was included in the analyses.
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The final set of limitations concerns the assumptions that must be made when conducting 
economic evaluations. These assumptions are comprehensively and clearly described in an 
appendix to this report. All of our assumptions are based on the best information available from 
published, peer-reviewed literature and recognized, reputable organizations. In all cases, we have 
made conservative assumptions. Given this approach, if our assumptions have produced biased 
results, they are much more likely to have underestimated, not overestimated, the benefits of the 
four strategies and the overall initiative.
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 1. Cost of MFH staff salaries, benefits, trainings for grantees, evaluation contracts, etc. 
   not included.
 2. Costs for EX Campaign and Tobacco-related Disparities strategies not included.
 
Tobacco Tax Strategy
 1. Number of volunteer hours not included. Data are not available.
Community Grants Strategy
 1. Removed funding for grantees for which program data not available (14 of 103 grants). 
 2. Included volunteer staff time and in-kind donations of people’s time. To estimate the 
   monetary value of this time, the number of volunteer and in-kind hours reported by grantees 
   in a given year was multiplied by the median hourly wage for all occupations in Missouri for 
   that year, as detailed in the table below.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Missouri Median Hourly 
Wage Estimate2 $14.02 $14.52 $14.70 $14.78 $14.99
Total Monetary Value  $67,422.18  $298,589.28  $326,133.02  $181,912.24  $84,930.19 
 3. Included additional funding grantees received to implement their programs, as detailed in 
   the table below.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Additional Funding 
Received by Grantees  $786.00  $11,200.00  $20,552.00  $52,666.63  $24,990.38 
Tobacco Policy Change Strategy
 1. Exact number of volunteer hours, in-kind donations, and additional funding not included. 
   Data are not available.
 2. Because these grantees relied heavily on volunteers, the number of volunteer hours was 
   estimated for each Tobacco Policy Change grant, based on data available from similar grants 
   within the Community Grants strategy. A valuation of the estimated volunteer time was 
   added to the Tobacco Policy Change strategy costs, following the same procedure as 
   described in the Community Grants strategy section.
Quitline Enhancement Strategy
 1. Included total funding provided by MFH to the Missouri Department of Health and Senior 
   Services (MDHSS) for expansion of the Missouri Quitline. MDHSS also utilized funding 
What is it Worth? An Economic Evaluation of the MFH Tobacco Initiative, 2012               Page 14
   from two small federal grants for the Missouri Quitline during the time period of the MFH 
   grant. These exact figures were obtained from MDHSS and added to the costs of the Quitline 
   Enhancement strategy, because the benefits of the Quitline were not divided according to 
   funding source. To remove the benefits gained from non-MFH Quitline funding, the 
   percentage of total Quitline funding from MFH (77.1%) was applied to the benefits.
Benefits
Across All Strategies
 1. Used the reported 1.58 increase in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) for each sustained     
   quitter.7,8 This estimate assumes: 
      i.  The average quitter is 45 years of age.
      ii. The benefits of quitting cease after age 65.
      iii. A discount rate of 3%.
      iv. A 35% probability of relapse.
      v. A compensation for background quits which would have occurred in the future 
        can be achieved by multiplying the QALYs by a factor of 0.79.
 2. Used the reported 3.4 increase in QALYs for each youth who doesn’t start smoking,10,11 
   discounted at 3%.
 3. Used data from Hodgson et al. (1992) on lifetime medical care expenditures due to smoking 
   to determine the medical care savings from adults quitting and youth prevented from 
   smoking.12 These expenditures were reported originally in 1992 dollars and were therefore 
   first updated for inflation, according to the medical care component of the consumer price 
   index. The values were converted from 1992 dollars to dollars of each year in the evaluation  
   timeframe and applied separately to the respective number of adults who quit and youth 
   prevented from smoking in each year. Since Hodgson did not include medical expenditures 
   for former smokers, the medical costs saved by someone quitting were estimated based 
   on work done by the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids.14 This work utilized estimates from 
   the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that current smokers have a 50% 
   chance of dying from smoking and former smokers have a 10-37% chance. This suggests 
   that former smokers’ excess health care costs compared to those of nonsmokers would range 
   from 10/50 to 37/50 of a smoker’s.14 The medical care costs saved from quitting were based 
   on this assumption. For youth who would be prevented from smoking, excess medical care 
   costs attributed to smokers compared to nonsmokers was used. All lifetime medical 
   expenditure savings were discounted at 3% into net present value. The table below presents 
   the consumer price index values and medical care savings updated for inflation for each year 
   in the assessment timeframe.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Consumer Price Index for Medical Care 
(% change from previous year)13 1.044 1.037 1.032 1.034 1.030
Lifetime Medical Care Savings for 
Smokers Who Quit $9,231.04 $9,572.59 $9,878.91 $10,214.79 $10,521.24
Lifetime Medical Care Savings for 
Youth Who Don’t Start Smoking $19,640.51 $20,367.20 $21,018.96 $21,733.60 $22,385.61
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Tobacco Tax Increase
 1. For the actual outcome of tax increase initiative (“Reality”):
    a. Assumed no benefits given the tobacco tax increase initiative failed.
 2. For the “Scenario” analyses: 
    a. The age categories for price elasticity (i.e., price effects on smoking) from the literature   
      (Chaloupka, 1999 and Ahmad & Franz, 2008) and the BRFSS Smoking Prevalence 
      Rates  for Missouri were not a perfect match; the categories were matched as closely 
      as possible.
    b. Weighted the decrease in prevalence of smoking among the Missouri population age    
      categories by the percentage in those categories; that weighted average was 4.41%.
    c. Divided the price elasticity (i.e., price effects on smoking) for each age group in half     
      because the reported price elasticity is for a decrease in the number of cigarettes       
      consumed; half of the elasticity is the actual reduction in prevalence. For every 10% 
      increase in the tobacco tax, the following percentages were used to calculate the       
      anticipated reduction in prevalence for each age group:
Age 15-17 18-23 24-29 30-39 40-65 65+
Anticipated % decrease 
in prevalence 4.2% 1.8% 1.5% 1.0% 1.0% 1.6%
Source: Chaloupka, 1999 and Ahmad & Franz, 2008
Smokefree Policy Changes
 1. Followed the procedure in Ong & Glantz (2005) to determine number of smokers who      
   would quit if a smokefree worksite policy passed. The procedure accounts for:
    a. Smokers who would quit anyway, without a policy (21% of quitters).
    b. A 90% compliance with the policy change (only for community-wide policies, 
      assumed 100% compliance for individual workplace policies).
    c. A 35% relapse rate for quitters.
 2. Did not include benefits from removal of exposure to secondhand smoke (e.g., reduction in 
   heart attacks).
Cessation Programs
 1. Calculated number of smokers who quit because of in-person cessation services using TIES 
   quit rate  data, specifically the 7-day point-prevalence, intent-to-treat quit rate data at 6-month 
   follow-up. Also assumed 35% probability of relapse and discounted at 3%.
 2. Used data from an external evaluation of the Missouri Quitline, specifically 7-day point-
   prevalence, intent-to-treat abstinence at the 6-month follow-up, to estimate the number of 
   smokers who quit because of the Quitline. Also assumed 35% probability of relapse and 
   discounted at 3%.
Youth Prevention Programs
 1. Used the estimated rate of smoking initiation for youth (10.2%)9 to calculate the number of 
   youth involved in the programs who would likely become established smokers.
 2. Used the reported 10% decrease in initiation rate reported in the IOM report , Ending the     
   Tobacco Problem: A Blueprint for a Nation,9 to determine how many youth would not initiate 
   smoking due to programs.
 3. Calculated number of youth prevented from smoking due to involvement in the programs.
Funding for this project was provided in whole by the Missouri Foundation for Health. The Missouri 
Foundation for Health is a philanthropic organization whose vision is to improve the health of the people in 
the communities it serves. 
